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Mutual Fund Risk: Mean Reversion or Gaming? 
 
Abstract 
The issue of whether mutual fund managers behave as though they are 
competing in a tournament has been the focus of several recent studies. Tournament 
behavior may be influenced by managers’ interim relative performance and whether 
they adjust their fund’s risk by their trades to win the tournament, improve their 
ranking, or prevent deterioration in their present ranking. It is an empirical issue as to 
whether a change in intertemporal risk is intentional or simply arises from risk mean 
reversion. Our methodology differentiates funds that actively trade to change risk 
from those whose risk is changed by trades with alternative motivations. Funds that 
are statistically identified as trading to change return variance or tracking error 
variance do not exhibit risk mean reversion. Rather, funds more commonly trade to 
reduce tracking error variance, particularly those with already low tracking error 
variances. We find weak evidence that underperforming funds intentionally trade to 
reduce return variance, and that trades designed to change tracking error variance are 









Mutual Fund Risk: Mean Reversion or Gaming? 
I. Introduction 
 
A mutual fund manager’s compensation is a function of the assets under 
management and better performing funds attract more monies from investors. In 
response, managers that are underperforming may engage in risk-taking, or 
alternatively, focus on their tenure and reduce the risk of their portfolio to limit their 
losses. To investigate the relation between managerial risk-taking and prior 
performance, changes to a fund’s risk that managers intended need to be distinguished 
from changes that occur through risk mean reversion. In the absence of this 
distinction, a spurious association between risk changes and prior return may be 
concluded. This follows because low risk funds which have lower expected returns 
revert towards higher risk and vice versa.  
Several studies have debated whether mutual fund managers behave as though 
they are competing in a tournament, and whether their behavior is influenced by their 
interim relative performance. Specifically, the issue is whether managers trade to 
finish highly ranked, win the tournament, or prevent deterioration in their present 
ranking. Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and 
others argue that mutual fund managers who have underperformed relative to their 
peers over a specific period may adjust the composition of the securities in their fund 
in an attempt to increase return over the remainder of the year. These studies argue 
that underperforming managers may trade securities that cause an increase in the risk 
of their fund. However, Schwarz (2008) suggests a manager lagging the benchmark 
may be concerned with job tenure and choose to “benchmark” to avoid slipping 
further behind. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) also suggest that funds outperforming the 
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market may trade to reduce risk to ensure that they continue to outperform the market, 
or, alternatively, may increase their risk in order to make a “top performers” list.  
The results of prior research examining tournament behavior are mixed. 
Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) report empirical evidence that managers with poor 
relative performance in the first part of the year trade securities to increase the return 
of their portfolios during the last part of the year. During this process, the variance of 
fund returns also increases. Their measure of risk change is the ratio of the fund’s 
standard deviation of returns (return variance) over the last part of the year relative to 
the first part of the year.  
 Considering both total and systematic risk, Koski and Pontiff (1999) find a 
negative relation between a fund’s risk and prior performance that is robust to a 
fund’s use of derivatives. Busse (2001) and Goriaev, Nijman and Werker (2005) 
attribute the Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) and Koski and Pontiff (1999) findings 
to biases in estimating return variance caused by the autocorrelation and cross-
correlation of fund returns. Allowing for these biases, using either daily or monthly 
fund returns to compute fund return variances, they are unable to support the finding 
of tournament behavior. 
 Chevalier and Ellison (1997) avoid the econometric difficulties associated 
with autocorrelation and cross-correlation of fund returns by using the individual 
stocks held by the fund. They consider whether managers that are outperforming the 
market choose to adjust their fund to track a benchmark portfolio and whether 
underperforming managers increase their fund’s risk in an attempt to generate higher 
returns. To focus on managers’ risk-taking behavior, they use the change in the 
standard deviation of the difference in fund returns and market returns over time. 
Referred to as “tracking error variance”, this measure is calculated by weighting the 
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covariances of the time series of excess returns of the individual stocks in the fund’s 
portfolio.  
Chen and Pennacchi (2007) develop a model that shows tracking error 
variance is the more appropriate measure of risk. Empirically, they find that when a 
fund is performing poorly, fund managers tend to increase tracking error variance, and 
not focus on total return variance. With the exception of Chevalier and Ellison (1997), 
who incorporate a piecewise linear term in their regression, prior analyses do not 
distinguish between underperforming funds that increase their return variance and 
better performing funds that consolidate their position and reduce their risk exposure.  
Managers trade for a variety of reasons but an observed change in a portfolio’s 
risk does not necessarily indicate an intention to alter the risk. Indeed, almost every 
purchase/sell decision causes a change in both a fund’s return variance and its 
tracking error variance. Huang, Sialm, and Zhang (2008) support this view, noting 
that a fund manager may trade to exploit changing investment opportunities and, in 
the process, alter the risk of the fund. Other trades might involve rebalancing 
portfolios, changing industry weightings and the like. 
While security trading causes fund risk to change, it is an empirical issue as to 
whether the change in risk is intentional or simply reflects risk mean reversion. That 
is, if a mutual fund has low (high) risk, trading will tend to increase (decrease) the risk 
unless the trades are deliberately designed to change the risk. Chevalier and Ellison 
(1997) find no evidence of mean reversion, but Schwarz (2008) shows both 
analytically and empirically how mean reversion can result from sorting on a 
particular risk measure. Both studies conclude that underperforming managers 
increase the risk of the fund in the last half of the year. With debate continuing on the 
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appropriate measurement of risk and whether risk mean reverts, we explore these 
issues and the distinction between intended and inadvertent changes to a fund’s risk.  
 We utilize a method that identifies the contribution that each stock in the 
portfolio makes towards a fund’s overall risk and tracking error risk. This allows us to 
test for statistical significance, on a fund-by-fund basis, whether there is a relation 
between the trades made by fund managers and the contribution that each stock makes 
to the portfolio’s risk. A statistically significant relation indicates that trades were 
deliberately made to change the risk. Our methodology allows us to distinguish 
between trades made to deliberately change the fund’s risk and those made for other 
reasons. If trades are made for other reasons, then mean reversion may occur. If, on 
the other hand, trades are made to deliberately change risk, then a direct relation 
should exist and mean reversion should be less pronounced.  
We contribute to the literature by first establishing with statistical significance 
whether increases or decreases to a fund’s return variance and tracking error variance 
are intentional. Subsequently, we explore the relation between these adjustments and 
prior fund performance. With information providers, such as Lippers and 
Morningstar, ranking funds on a frequent basis, investors can frequently choose to 
switch funds. Accordingly, we investigate the relation between risk-taking and prior 
return on a moving quarterly basis. We use the quarterly stockholdings of 3,142 
mutual funds between 1991 and 2006 as reported by Thomson Financial Services Inc., 
resulting in 49,661 fund-periods for analysis.  
 Our results show that some funds deliberately increase, while others decrease, 
both tracking error variance and return variance. Unlike previous studies that 
implicitly assume equal numbers of risk increasing and risk reducing funds based on 
the median risk change, we find substantially more funds trade to reduce rather than 
 6
increase tracking error variance. Ignoring trade intentions, we find evidence of mean 
reversion in both risk measures, and that the mean reversion of the return standard 
deviation causes mean reversion of the tracking error standard deviation. We find 
limited support for a positive relation between prior returns and risk changes, a result 
that is inconsistent with tournament behavior. Focusing on the funds that intentionally 
trade to either increase risk or decrease risk, we find there is no evidence of mean 
reversion nor of prior returns driving risk changes. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II we develop our empirical 
predictions and in Section III we discuss the data and methodology. Section IV 
provides the empirical results and Section V concludes the study. 
 
II. Empirical Predictions 
The risk of a mutual fund is a function of the variances and covariances of the 
stocks in the portfolio. Fund managers cannot change the variances or covariances, 
but can change the risk of the fund by adding/deleting stocks or changing the 
proportion invested in each stock. Mutual funds may trade stocks to change the fund’s 
risk or in response to fund flows, expectations of individual stock performances, or to 
alter industry weightings. 
Previous literature has considered whether changes to fund risk are motivated 
by tournament behavior, where managers that experience poor returns deliberately 
increase their fund’s risk in an effort to increase returns.  However, changes to a 
fund’s risk may also arise from trades that are motivated by reasons other than 
tournament behavior.  Such trades produce, on average, mean reversion of fund return 
variances.  This follows because high (low) risk funds hold stocks with high (low) 
variances and/or covariances, and trading of stocks which is not intended to alter a 
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fund’s risk will occur predominantly in stocks with lower (higher) variances and/or 
covariances than those in the extant portfolio.   
Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) use total return variances in their 
examination of tournament behavior, while Chevalier and Ellison (1997) develop their 
tournament model relative to tracking error variance, or the variance of the differences 
between fund return and market return.  We show that both measures of risk are 
highly correlated.  Furthermore, the mechanism responsible for mean reversion of 
return variance will, as a consequence of this relation, produce mean reversion of 
tracking error variance. 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) define tracking error variance (TEVj) as:   
)1()( mjj rrVarTEV −≡
 
where rj and rm are the monthly returns for fund j and the value weighted market 
index, respectively.  This is equivalent to: 
  
)2(2 5.05.0 mjjmmjj VarVarVarVarTEV ρ−+=  
where ρjm is the correlation between the returns of fund j and the market.  Equation 
(2) suggests that as an approximation, TEVj is positively related to Varj and 
negatively related to the square root of Varj.  Using the square roots of the variables to 
reduce heteroskedasticity, we can estimate the following approximation: 
  )3(1
5.0
121101 −−−− +++= jtjtjtjt SDbSDbaTESD ε  
where TESDj and SDj are the square roots of TEVj and Varj, respectively.  We predict 
that b1 will be positive and close to unity while b2 will be negative. 
Given the approximate relation defined in equation (3), and taking the 





































We predict that b1 will also be positive and close to unity while b2 will be negative. 
Equation (5) defines the relation between changes to the standard deviation of 
fund returns and changes to the standard deviation of tracking errors which we 
establish empirically using 49,660 fund-periods.  Because ∆TESDjt is inversely related 
to the square root of SDjt-1, b2 will exert an influence over the sign of the relation 
between ∆TESDjt and ∆SDjt only for low values of SDjt-1.  Therefore, if b1 has the 
expected sign, the relation between ∆TESDjt and ∆SDjt will be mainly positive.  
Accordingly, mean reversion of return standard deviation will produce mean reversion 
in tracking error standard deviation. 
 
III. Data Description and Methodology 
A.  Data Description 
We obtain the periodic stockholdings of all US equity mutual funds for the 
period January 1991 – June 2006 from Thomson Financial Services Ltd. Fund 
transactions are inferred from changes to the holdings, which are most commonly 
reported quarterly, while allowing for stock capitalization changes. The holdings data 
are combined with monthly stock price and return data from the Centre for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Mutual Fund Links is used to match the 
Thomson’s holdings with the monthly fund returns obtained from the CRSP database. 
To ensure that the data adequately represent mutual fund holdings, the sample 
is restricted to funds with average equity holdings exceeding 80% and average cash 
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holdings below 10%. Start-of-period CRSP stock prices are used with the Thomson 
holdings data to calculate the net tangible asset values of each mutual fund. These 
calculated values are compared with actual net tangible asset values and the fund is 
excluded if the discrepancy exceeds 10%. The final dataset consists of 3,142 funds 
with 49,661 fund-periods. The number of fund-periods for regressions that require the 
matching of fund returns and control variable data reduces to 24,724. 
 
B.  Methodology 
Employing a method similar to Chevalier and Ellison (1997) to calculate fund 
tracking error and return variances, we explore the relation between tracking error 
variance and return variance for each fund-period. As a consequence we are able to 
discover how changes to a fund's portfolio simultaneously change both the tracking 
error variance and the return variance of the fund. We also investigate the relation 
between changes to fund risk and prior risk and prior return.  Subsequently, we 
develop a method for identifying trades designed to change fund risk. Focusing on 
funds that we identify as having purposely altered their risk, we repeat the 
investigation of the relation between changes to fund risk and prior risk and prior 
return. 
 
B.1.  Dependence of Changes to Tracking Error Variance on Changes to Return 
Variance 
We calculate the variance of returns on each fund’s equity portfolio at the start 
of each period, by weighting the covariances of the returns of the stocks in the 
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portfolio measured over the previous 60 months1 with the proportionate value that 
each stock comprises. Following Chevalier and Ellison (1997), we calculate the return 
variances at the end of each period by maintaining the same covariances, while using 
end-of-period proportionate values. We include stocks that are acquired during a 
period in our calculation of the covariances.   
The start- and end-of-period tracking error variances are calculated in a similar 
manner, but instead use stock returns in excess of the value weighted market index 
over the preceding 60 months to derive the return covariances. We convert return 
variances and tracking error variances into standard deviations, SD and TESD, 
respectively, to follow Chevalier and Ellison (1997). These start- and end-of-period 
SDs and TESDs are used to calculate changes in the portfolios’ standard deviation, 
∆SD, and tracking error standard deviation, ∆TESD.   
Equation (3) describes the relation between return standard deviation and 
tracking error standard deviation.  This relation is tested by using the start of period 
SDs and TESDs calculated for 49,659 fund-periods. Similarly, the relation between 
changes to return standard deviation and tracking error standard deviation over a 
period is described by equation (5).  Using the ∆SDs and ∆TESDs calculated for 
49,659 fund-periods, the parameters in equation (5) are also estimated. 
 
B.2.  Risk Mean Reversion  and Return and Tracking Error Variances  
If a fund’s trades cause the return variance and tracking error variance to be 
mean reverting, then the change in return standard deviation (∆SDt) and tracking error 
standard deviation (∆TESDt) should be negatively related to the start-of-period return 
                                                 
1 We eliminate stocks without a minimum of 6 months of returns. If greater than 10% of the stocks by 
value are eliminated, then we remove the fund-period from consideration. 
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standard deviation and tracking error standard deviation, respectively. We investigate 
this relation by estimating equations (6) and (7) which are described in the following 
section. 
 
B.3.  Prior Performance and Changes to Return Variance and Tracking Error Variance  
We investigate how the return variance, and tracking error variance are related 
to the return performance of a mutual fund over the preceding 9-, 6- and 3-month 
intervals. Tournament behavior is consistent with a negative relation between 
preceding period returns and changes to fund risk as measured by ∆SD and ∆TESD. 
Consistent with Chevalier and Ellison (1997) it is expected that funds that are 
underperforming (outperforming) their competitors will increase (decrease) the risk of 
their funds. 
To achieve this, we estimate equations (6) and (7): 
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Separate regressions are performed for returns over the previous 9-, 6- and 3-
month periods. Mean reversion is tested in equations (6) and (7) by examining ∆SDjt 
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and ∆TESDjt relative to SDjt-1 and TESDjt-1. Equation (6) includes the return standard 
deviation and equation (7) includes both the return standard deviation and the tracking 
error standard deviation at the start of each period. The market index return and 
market volatility are used as control variables, and both are expected to be positively 
related to the risk measures. When the market is increasing (decreasing), investors are 
more willing to assume more (less) risk. Similarly, the risk appetite of investors in 
mutual funds may reflect volatility in the broader market. Portfolio turnover is 
included because managers engaging in tournament behavior may be more likely to 
actively trade and because return may be a function of trading volume. Chevalier and 
Ellison (1997) point out that larger funds tend to engage in less risk adjustment than 
smaller funds, so size (corrected for growth over time) is also included as a control 
variable. 
 
B.4.  Identification of Trades Which Intentionally Change  Return Variance and 
Tracking Error Variance  
Virtually all trades conducted by a fund will alter the fund’s return variance 
and tracking error variance. However, our aim is to identify trading designed to 
deliberately increase/decrease return variance and tracking error variance. We achieve 
this by measuring the contribution that each stock makes to the variances of a fund’s 
portfolio and refer to these values as the stock’s “return variance contribution” and 
“tracking error variance contribution”. Next, we compare the return variance 
contributions of the stocks traded by a fund during a period with the return variance 
contributions of the stocks held at the start of the period. In a procedure similar to 
Sharpe and Cooper (1972), we rank the stocks held by a fund at the start of a period by 
their return variance contribution, and assign them into 20 equal value buckets. Stocks 
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that are acquired by a fund during a period are also assigned to these buckets. 
Analogous to the Sharpe and Cooper (1972) weighting method, we compute the return 
variance contribution for each bucket as a value-weighted average of the return 
variance contribution of each stock in the bucket. 
For each fund, we determine the value of the stocks traded during a period for 
each return variance contribution bucket. We assign a negative value to sell trades and 
a positive value to buy trades. By construction, there is no relation between the value 
of each bucket and the return variance contribution.2 If trades are uniform across the 
20 risk buckets, then no relation should be found between trades and their contribution 
to the fund’s risk.  However, if trades are designed to increase (decrease) risk, then 
stocks that contribute more (less) to a fund’s risk will be more heavily purchased. 
Similarly, stocks that contribute less (more) to a fund’s risk will be more heavily sold 
to increase (decrease) the fund’s risk. Stock purchases and sales may occur 
simultaneously, and as a consequence, the risk of the fund will reflect the overall 
trades. 
The contribution that each stock in a fund’s portfolio makes to the fund’s 
return variance and tracking error variance must be determined. Specifically, we 
calculate T

 , the vector of “return variance contributions” of each stock held by fund 











                                                 
2 When a fund’s holdings are partitioned into equal value buckets, a particular stockholding usually 
straddles the boundary. When this occurs, we assign half the value of the stockholding and half the 
value of the trades to the return variance contribution bucket on either side of the boundary. We use 10 
equal value return variance contribution buckets when we are unable to assign the stocks to 20 buckets 
(such as when a single stock comprises more than 5% of a fund’s stockholding). 
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where: n  = number of stocks held during the period; 
 xk = proportion by value that stock k comprises at the start of period t; 
 rit = monthly returns of stock i over the previous 60 months; and 
 rkt = monthly returns of stock k over the previous 60 months. 
The weighted average of the return variance contributions gives the fund’s return 




















 = vector of portfolio weights (xit’s) for stock i held by fund j at the start of 
period t; and 
  M = covariance matrix of stock returns for fund j at the start of period t. 
By calculating T

, we can identify the vector elements corresponding to each 
stock and use these to rank and assign the stocks to one of the twenty return variance 
contribution buckets. The value of the stock contained in each contribution bucket is 
equal; however, the return variance contribution of a bucket will reflect the return 
variance contributions of the stocks it contains.   For any particular bucket j the return 
variance contribution (RVC) is given by: 
j.bucket  RVCin   stocks ofnumber  n  and
 t; periodofstart  at the held j)bucket   to(belonging istock  of valueheldstockValue





























Trades that are made over the period change the weightings and cause the 
return variance contributions to change for each bucket, j, and as a consequence, the 
variance of the fund. To determine the nature of the trades, the value of the trades 
over the period in each bucket j is regressed on the RVCs of the buckets at the start of 
the period.  
)11(RVC jjjValueTrade εβα ++=  









We contend that if the regression coefficient on RVCj is significantly positive 
(negative), then the trades were made with the intention to increase (decrease) risk. If, 
however, the coefficient is not significant, the trades were not intended to change the 
risk of the fund.    
Analogous calculations are made to determine the vector of each stock’s 
contribution to the variance of the tracking error of fund j during period t, where the 











where:  rmt = monthly market returns over the previous 60 months. 
This equation is similar to equation (8), but excess returns are used in the calculations. 
It provides the tracking error variance contribution, TEVC, for each stock in the fund 
and allows ranking on this risk measure. By symmetry, TEVC replaces RVC in 
equations (10) and (11). Like equation (11), if the regression coefficient on TEVCj is 
significantly positive (negative) at the 10% level, then the trades were made with the 
intention to increase (decrease) tracking error risk. If, however, the coefficient is not 
significant, the trades were not intended to change the TEV of the fund.    
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These regressions are performed on each of the 49,661 fund-periods between 
January 1991 and June 2006. We refer to the coefficients associated with RVC and 
TEVC as RVCBeta(s) and TEVCBeta(s), respectively. The number of RVCBetas 
(TEVCBetas) that are significantly different from zero could have occurred as a 
random event.3 The cumulative binomial distribution is used to determine whether the 
observed number of significant RVCBetas (TEVCBetas) occurred by chance. The 
number of regressions is used as the number of trials, the level of significance at 
which we find the RVCBetas (TEVCBetas) to be positive or negative as the 
probability of a success, while the critical number of successes corresponds to a 
cumulative binomial probability of 1%.  
   
B.5.  Trades Intentionally Changing  Return Variance and Tracking Error Variance – 
Prior Returns and Risk Mean Reversion 
Funds with significant return variance betas and tracking error variance betas 
are classified as deliberately trading to change their risk. For both risk measures, the 
funds are classed as increasing or decreasing risk according to the sign of the 
corresponding beta. These binary outcomes are logistically regressed on the return 
performance of the mutual funds over the preceding 9-, 6- and 3-month intervals. If 
prior returns are motivating their risk changing behavior, then a relation between 
preceding months’ returns and the sign of the RVCBeta and the TEVCBeta should be 
evident. Furthermore, if funds exhibit tournament behavior, the relation is expected to 
be negative, with funds that are underperforming (outperforming) their competitors 
increasing (decreasing) the risk of their funds.  
                                                 
3 In separate tests, we confirm that our method generates the expected level of 5% negative and 5% 
positive betas when we randomly rank stocks. 
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Logistic regressions are used to estimate equations (13) and (14) where, 
respectively, RVCBeta and TEVCBeta take on values of +1 (-1) if the coefficient is 
significantly positive (negative).  Equations (13) and (14) are estimated using only 
those funds that have statistically increased or decreased their portfolio’s SD and 
TESD.  
)13(000,1/)SizeTOVIXMRSDR(RVCBeta 6514312110 jtjtjtttjtjtjt bbbbbba ε+++++++= −−−
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Separate regressions are performed for returns over the previous 9-, 6- and 3-
month periods. As before, if managers engage in tournament behavior, prior returns 
influence their decisions to change the risk of their funds and a negative relation is 
expected. The coefficient associated with SDjt-1 and TESDjt-1 will be positive 
(negative) if managers achieve their intention of increasing (decreasing) the risk of 
high risk portfolios and decreasing (increasing) the risk of low risk portfolios. Unlike 
equations (6) and (7) where a negative coefficient on SDjt-1 and TESDjt-1, respectively, 
could be produced by random trading leading to mean reversion, a negative coefficient 
in equations (13) and (14) will only result from deliberate action. Equation (13) 
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includes the return standard deviation and equation (14) includes both the return 
standard deviation and tracking error standard deviation at the start of each period as 
independent variables. The control variables are the same as those previously used in 
equations (6) and (7).  
 
IV.  Empirical Results 
A.  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the 3,142 funds involving 49,661 
fund-periods between 1991 and 2006. The market capitalization distribution is highly 
skewed, reflecting a few very large funds. Fund market capitalization increased 
markedly over the period as the stock market increased and as new monies flowed into 
the funds. The period over which we examine the funds’ trades is most commonly 
either 90 days (66%) or 180 days (27%). It is observed that the total return standard 
deviation is approximately twice as large as the tracking error standard deviation. 
Also, the average (median) correlation between the mutual funds’ and the market 
returns is high at 0.865 (0.896).  
[Insert Table 1] 
 
B.  Relation Between Return Variance and Tracking Error Variance 
Equation (2) describes the theoretical relation between return variance and 
tracking error variance from which we derive the approximation that shows tracking 
error standard deviation relative to return standard deviation in equation (3). Similarly, 
we derive the approximation in equation (5) which relates change of tracking error 
standard deviation to change in return standard deviation. Table 2 documents the 
parameter estimates for these regressions. Both models have high explanatory power 
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with adjusted r-squares of 0.779 and 0.763, respectively, and the coefficients are 
highly significant, with the predicted signs. Accordingly, mean reversion of the 
standard deviation will produce mean reversion in tracking error standard deviation.  
[Insert Table 2] 
C.  Return Variance and Tracking Error Variance – Mean Reversion and Prior Returns  
Table 3 reports the regression results for equation (6) where the change in fund 
return standard deviation is the dependent variable. The highly significant negative 
coefficient on the start-of-period return standard deviation in all models provides 
strong evidence that return variance is mean reverting. Model 1 is estimated using 
48,436 fund-periods. In order to incorporate the tournament hypothesis, prior returns 
are needed, and Model 2 uses the subsample of 24,724 fund-periods for which we can 
match 9-month prior returns.  
The significantly positive signs on prior returns do not support the tournament 
hypothesis that fund managers increase the risk of their portfolios following relatively 
poor performance. It should be noted that the addition of fund performance over the 
previous 9-, 6-, and 3-months in Models 3, 4 and 5, respectively, contributes little to 
the explanatory power of the model as indicated by the adjusted r-square.4 As 
expected the control variables of market return and market volatility are significantly 
positively related to the change in return standard deviation. Similar to Chevalier and 
Ellison (1997), who suggest the smaller funds tend to adjust risk levels more than 
larger funds, the size of the funds is negatively related to risk. Turnover appears to be 
unrelated to risk.    
[Insert Table 3] 
                                                 
4 The number of observations in models two through five varies slightly dependent on the number of 
matching return months available.  
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Table 4 reports the regression results for equation (7) where the change in the 
tracking error standard deviation is the dependent variable. Model 1 uses 48,436 fund-
periods, but the sample is reduced to 24,723 fund-periods for Model 2. Highly 
significant negative coefficients are associated with both the start-of-period tracking 
error standard deviation and the return standard deviation, both of which indicate that 
the change in tracking error standard deviation is strongly mean reverting. As above, 
the addition of prior return performance in Models 3, 4 and 5 contributes little to the 
explanatory power of the model.5 The size and significance of the coefficients on the 
control variables of market return, market volatility, and size are similar to the results 
shown in Table 3.  Although Table 3 does not show that turnover is significantly 
related to ∆SD, there is some evidence in Table 4 that turnover is negatively related to 
∆TESD. 
[Insert Table 4] 
  In summary, irrespective of whether return variance or tracking error variance 
is used, the results support risk mean reversion and are not consistent with the 
tournament hypothesis.    
 
D.  Identification of Trades that Intentionally Change Return Variance and Tracking 
Error Variance  
In general, it is expected that low risk portfolios produce lower returns. 
Accordingly, it is difficult to distinguish underperforming funds that deliberately 
increase the risk of their portfolios because of this underperformance, from funds 
                                                 
5 The standardized coefficients (not shown) on start-of-period return standard deviation and tracking 
error standard deviation indicate that together they explain 37% of the change in the tracking error 
standard deviation compared with less than 7.5% from prior returns. 
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whose return variance and tracking error variance increase as a consequence of mean 
reversion. By examining changes to the individual fund’s portfolio, however, we are 
able to determine with statistical confidence whether trades were conducted with the 
intention of increasing or decreasing these variances. 
To determine if there is a relation between the proportion of stocks traded 
during a period and the stock’s return variance contribution, 49,661 univariate linear 
regressions are performed. Each regression is for one fund-period, and fund-periods 
with return variance contribution betas (RVCBeta) significant at the 10% level (two-
tailed) are identified. A repeat set of regressions using tracking error variance 
contribution are performed to determine the tracking error variance contribution betas 
(TEVCBeta). Table 5 reports the pooled count of significant regression coefficients 
(betas) over the sixteen-year period. A negative beta indicates trading that reduced the 
return variance or tracking error variance of a fund’s portfolio. Funds exhibiting 
negative betas are preferentially purchasing stocks with low return variance 
contributions (tracking error variance contributions) or selling stocks with high return 
variance contributions (tracking error variance contributions) or both.  
[Insert Table  5] 
The binomial distribution is used to determine whether the frequency of the 
significant RVCBetas (TEVCBetas) differ from that expected by a random 
occurrence. Panel A of Table 5 shows that both negative and positive significant 
return variance betas exceed the corresponding 1% cumulative binomial critical 
values. At 14.4%, about twice as many funds trade to reduce the fund’s return 
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variance6 as the 8.2% that trade to increase the funds’ return variance. We find that 
gaming to increase total risk is less common than is implicitly assumed in other 
studies, such as Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) who classify 50% of the funds as 
risk increasing and 50% as risk decreasing. 
In Panel A, of the 49,661 TEVCBeta regression coefficients, 23.5% are 
significantly negative, which exceeds the 1% cumulative binomial critical value.  
Correspondingly, 4.5% of the coefficients are significantly positive and are 
significantly below the number that would be expected by chance. It is apparent that 
these funds consider the contribution a stock makes to the fund’s tracking error 
variance. Furthermore, it is clear that almost one quarter of the funds trade stocks with 
a view to reducing the fund’s tracking error variance, while those that trade to increase 
tracking error variance are relatively few. This contrasts with the underlying 
assumption of previous studies that assume funds “game” tracking error, which they 
increase or decrease with similar propensity.  
  The annual breakdown of RVCBeta and TEVCBeta is shown in Panel B of 
Table 5.  The counts are time-variant, but negative RVCBetas occur more frequently 
than random expectation in all years, while the count of positive RVCBetas is above 
expectation in most years. The TEVCBetas exhibit more gradual changes, and all 
negative TEVCBetas occur more frequently and most positive TEVCBetas occur less 
frequently than randomly expected. 
 
                                                 
6 The funds of interest are ones that conduct their trades to reduce return variance that we can 
statistically confirm at the 10% level. Clearly, other funds may also trade to reduce return variance, but 
this relation is either nonlinear or not statistically significant. 
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E.  Trades that Intentionally Change Return Variance and Tracking Error Variance – 
Mean Reversion and Prior Returns  
The prior regressions statistically identified those funds that have deliberately 
traded to change the risk of the fund. The results of the binary logistic regression of 
RVCBeta on prior returns, start-of-period return standard deviation and control 
variables defined by equation (13) are provided in Table 6. Model 1 includes 10,985 
fund-periods with significantly negative or positive RVCBetas. The sample is reduced 
to 5,565 fund-periods when matching prior returns are required for Model 2.  
[Insert Table  6] 
The coefficient on the SDjt-1 variable is insignificant in all models. If 
managers’ of funds with high (low) return variance intended to reduce (increase) the 
funds’ return variance this relation would have been negative, and conversely, would 
have been positive if managers of high (low) return variance funds had sought to 
increase (decrease) return variance. By restricting the analysis to fund-periods where 
managers deliberately change the return variance, we have removed the negative 
relation between changes to return variance (SDjt-1) that was apparent in Table 3.  This 
indicates that mean reversion of fund return variances are caused by trades that are not 
conducted with the intent to alter risk.  
The coefficients for prior returns are only significant for 9- and 6-months, and 
being positive, do not support risk-gaming by underperforming fund managers. 
Similar to the Table 3 results, inclusion of the 9-, 6-, and 3-month prior returns only 
marginally improves the explanatory power of the model.  
[Insert Table  7] 
Table 7 provides results for analogous logistic regressions where the 
dependent variable is TEVCBeta using values that are significantly positive or 
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negative.  In Model 1, the 13,582 significant TEVCBetas are obtained from the 
sample of 48,430 fund-periods, while in Model 2 the 6,818 significant TEVCBetas are 
obtained from the 24,723 fund periods.  Consistent with Table 6, the coefficient on 
start-of-period return standard deviation is not significant in any model.  The 
coefficient on start-of-period tracking error standard deviation is significantly positive 
in all models and therefore has the incorrect sign for consistency with mean reversion 
of tracking error variance. Furthermore, it appears that our focus on fund-periods with 
statistically significant changes to tracking error variance has (similar to Table 6) 
removed the impact of ‘random trading’ to which we attribute the negative 
coefficients on SDjt-1 and TESDjt-1 in Table 4.  
Cognizant of the result in Table 5 that funds more commonly trade to reduce 
rather than increase tracking error variance, the positive coefficient on TESDjt-1 in 
Table 7 suggests that funds with low tracking error variances are deliberately seeking 
to further reduce tracking error variance. This is consistent with the expectation that 
funds which exhibit trading aimed at reducing tracking error variance would, over 
time, tend to have lower tracking error variances. Notably, no evidence of tournament 
behavior is found as the relation between intentional changes to tracking error 
variance and prior return is insignificant in all models.  
For Table 6 the RVCBeta is significantly positively related to the market 
return and market volatility control variables. We also find that turnover is negatively 
related to RVCBeta. This negative relation may be because most funds are trying to 
reduce return variance, and those that more actively trade are more successful in 
achieving the reduction. Since the number of funds trying to increase return variance 
is close to random, the overall results are driven by those seeking to reduce return 
variance. Fund size is positively related to RVCBeta. We conjecture that the smaller 
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funds are trading to more closely track the index and, hence, to reduce return variance. 
Because large established funds are more likely to reflect the index, it is less likely 
that they trade to reduce return variance. The TEVCBeta results shown in Table 7 
parallel those for the RVCBeta. 
 
  
F.  Dependence of Changes to Tracking Error Variance on Changes to Return 
Variance 
Of the 11,223 fund-periods with significant RVCBetas and 13,905 fund-
periods with significant TEVCBetas reported in Table 5, 6,259 fund-periods exhibit 
both significant RVCBetas and TEVCBetas. That is, with statistical confidence, these 
funds’ trades simultaneously alter return variance and tracking error variance. This 
finding indicates that some fund managers in adjusting risk, simultaneously alter both 





 Trading by a fund alters the composition of the assets in its portfolio and 
changes its return variance and tracking error variance. If managers trade with no 
intention of changing the risk of the fund, the risk of high risk funds will tend to revert 
downward and the risk of low risk funds will tend to revert upward. Chevalier and 
Ellison (1997) examine this issue but find no evidence of mean reversion. In contrast, 
our results support risk mean reversion for funds whose trade motivation is unclear.  
However, managers deliberately trying to reduce the risk of the fund can 
actively purchase low risk stocks or avoid buying high risk stocks. An opposite 
strategy could be used to increase risk. The methodology developed in this study 
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allows the identification of management trading to deliberately change the risk of the 
fund, and distinguish these risk changes from those attributed to mean reversion. 
Focusing only on funds that exhibit statistically significant preferences for increasing 
or decreasing risk, we find that 23.5% of the funds deliberately trade to reduce 
tracking error variance from one period to the next while only 4.5% trade to increase 
tracking error variance. Although less pronounced, asymmetric preferences for 
reducing total return variance risk are found.  
By examining tournament behavior in funds that deliberately trade to change 
their risk, we find weak evidence that funds that increase return variance do so after 
experiencing returns that exceed those of funds that decrease return variance. We find 
no association between prior return and tracking error variance. This contrasts with 
previous studies which do not distinguish deliberate from inadvertent risk changes, 
and find that poor prior returns motivate fund managers to increase the fund’s risk in 
an attempt to increase returns. Overall, our methodology allows a more precise 
examination of tournament behavior than earlier studies by avoiding the confounding 
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Descriptive Statistics for Mutual Funds, 1991-2006 
Tracking error variance is defined as )rrvar( mtjt −  and return variance as )rvar( jt  where rjt 
and rmt are the returns of stock j and the market over the previous 60 months. 
 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Number of fund-periods 49,661   
Number of funds 3,142   
Market capitalization ($ million)    
1991 – 1996 563.6 143.1 1,688.5 
1997 – 2001 1,216.8 229.2 4,355.7 
2002 – 2006 1,542.1 320.4 5,379.8 
Number of stocks in portfolio 122 86 224 
Period (days) 127 92 43 
Return variance 0.0047 0.0028 0.0074 
Return standard deviation 0.0612 0.0530 0.0313 
∆ Return variance -0.0001 0.0000 0.0023 
∆ Return standard deviation -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0077 
Tracking error variance 0.0017 0.0008 0.0045 
Tracking error standard deviation 0.0336 0.0282 0.0247 
∆ Tracking error variance -0.0001 0.0000 0.0016 
∆ Tracking error standard deviation -0.0002 0.0001 0.0072 
Market variance 0.0020 0.0021 0.0008 






Relation between Tracking Error Standard Deviation and Standard Deviation  
 
Tracking Error Standard Deviation: 
1
5.0
121101 −−−− +++= jtjtjtjt SDbSDbaTESD ε   
















where TESDjt-1 is the tracking error standard deviation of fund j at time t-1, SDjt-1 is the 
return standard deviation of fund j at time t-1. ∆TESDjt and ∆SDjt are changes in these 











Panel A: Tracking Error Standard Deviation 
Constant 0.032***  44.02 0.779 
SDjt-1 1.188*** 1.503 133.34  
Square root SDjt-1 -0.294*** -0.640 -56.75  
Panel B: Change in Tracking Error Standard Deviation 
Constant 0.000***  12.64 0.763 
∆SDjt 1.341*** 1.446 177.06  
∆SDjt/square root SDjt -0.187*** -0.610 -74.69  





Change to Return Variance – Prior Returns and Risk Mean Reversion 
Regression of: 
000,1/)SizeTOVIXMRSDR(SD 6514312110 jtjtjtttjtjtjt bbbbbba ε+++++++=∆ −−−  
Where: 
 t.period in j fund of tioncapitaliza edstandardizSize
and  t;period in j fund of turnover portfolioTO
 t; time to(VIX)atility market vol average month-6VIX
 t; time toreturnmarket  month-6MR
 t;period ofstart  at the j fund of deviation standard returnSD
 t;period ofstart   the tomonths 3or  6, 9,over  j fund on return excess annualizedR





















  Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 3.010*** 3.449*** 3.479*** 3.454*** 3.537*** 
 (7.56) (6.51) (6.57) (6.515) (6.72) 
R9jt-1   1.317***   
   (3.80)   
R6jt-1    3.052***  
    (10.27)  
R3jt-1     2.236*** 
     (11.00) 
SDjt-1 -75.64*** -83.305*** -83.374*** -84.187*** -85.114*** 
 (-66.32) (-51.00) (-51.05) (-51.38) (-51.28) 
MRt 9.812*** 9.652*** 9.952*** 10.335*** 10.190*** 
 (29.77) (22.32) (22.65) (23.48) (23.20) 
VIXt 0.113*** 0.121*** 0.124*** 0.130*** 0.129*** 
 (18.35) (15.18) (15.48) (16.25) (16.27) 
TOjt -0.148 0.175 0.190 0.185 0.202 
 (-1.36) (1.18) (1.28) (1.25) (1.36) 
Sizejt -1.409*** -1.626*** -1.712*** -1.769*** -1.804*** 
 (-3.91) (-3.38) (-3.56) (-3.68) (-3.78) 
N 48,436 24,724 24,724 24,576 24,529 
Adjusted R2 0.127 0.145 0.146 0.150 0.150 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  







Change to Tracking Error Variance – Prior Returns and Risk Mean Reversion  
Regression of: 
 000,1/)SizeTOVIXMRSDTESDR(TESD 761541312110 jtjtjtttjtjtjtjt bbbbbbba ε++++++++=∆ −−−−  
Where: 
 t.period in j fund of tioncapitaliza edstandardizSize
and  t;period in j fund of turnover portfolioTO
 t; time to(VIX)atility market vol average month-6VIX
 t; time toreturnmarket  month-6MR
 t;period ofstart  at the j fund of deviation standard returnSD
 t;period ofstart  at the j fund of deviation standarderror  trackingTESD
 t;period ofstart   the tomonths 3or  6, 9,over  j fund on return excess annualizedR

























  Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 4.525*** 5.021*** 5.080*** 5.078*** 5.186*** 
 (12.10) (10.27) (10.39) (10.40) (10.69) 
R9jt-1   1.508***   
   (4.68)   
R6jt-1    2.952***  
    (10.73)  
R3jt-1     2.270*** 
     (12.08) 
TESDjt-1 -79.025*** -90.367*** -92.840*** -96.366*** -96.126*** 
 (-3.22) (-26.54) (-26.96) (-28.07) (-28.22) 
SDjt-1 -13.287*** -16.470*** -15.014*** -13.848*** -15.80*** 
 (-6.40) (-6.35) (-5.75) (-5.31) (-6.11) 
MRt 3.278*** 2.187*** 2.515*** 2.751*** 2.46*** 
 (10.60) (5.49) (6.22) (6.80) (6.09) 
VIXt 0.082*** 0.086*** 0.089*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 
 (14.27) (11.69) (12.12) (12.86) (12.80) 
TOjt -0.415*** -0.212 -0.195 -0.192 -0.180 
 (-4.07) (-1.55) (-1.42) (-1.41) (-1.33) 
Sizejt -2.910*** -2.949*** -3.088*** -3.160*** -3.155*** 
 (-8.53) (-6.61) (-6.91) (-7.09) (-7.13) 
N 48,430 24,723 24,723 24,575 24,528 
Adjusted R2 0.109 0.127 0.128 0.134 0.134 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  





Significant Variance Contribution Betas  
We report the number of statistically significant (10%) return variance contribution 
betas generated from 49,661 linear regressions of:  
jjj εβα ++= RVCTradeValue , 
where: 
j.bucket  RVCin  stocks ofnumber  n
and ;),cov( RVCStock 
 t; periodofstart  at the held j)bucket   to(belonging istock  of valueheldstockValue











































Results for tracking error variance contribution beta are generated using an analogous 
methodology which differs in that the market return is subtracted from the stock returns 
prior to calculating the return covariances. These are performed on 49,661 fund-periods 
between January 1991 and June 2006. 
  Return Variance 
Contribution Beta 
Tracking Error Variance 
Contribution Beta 
Year N Negative (%) Positive (%) Negative (%) Positive (%) 
Panel A:  Full Sample 
1991-2006 49,661 14.4*** 8.2*** 23.5*** 4.5*** 
Panel B:  Annual Breakdown 
1991 1159 8.6*** 11.6*** 18.6*** 4.9 
1992 1806 13.6*** 9.2*** 20.2*** 5.1 
1993 1982 14.7*** 5.1 22.7*** 4.0*** L 
1994 2222 14.8*** 5.1 25.2*** 3.6** L 
1995 2579 19.0*** 4.8 28.3*** 2.5*** L 
1996 2610 19.1*** 3.9***L 29.7*** 2.8*** L 
1997 3519 15.6*** 6.4*** 25.0*** 4.0*** L 
1998 3739 14.1*** 8.4*** 23.3*** 5.2 
1999 3525 11.8*** 9.7*** 23.1*** 5.7** 
2000 4327 17.8*** 12.0*** 25.6*** 7.1*** 
2001 3848 14.8*** 10.7*** 26.6*** 5.0 
2002 4191 15.3*** 9.5*** 25.0*** 4.5* L 
2003 4059 13.5*** 10.2*** 20.0*** 4.9 
2004 4509 11.0*** 9.2*** 19.5*** 4.2*** L 
2005 4372 11.8*** 4.9 20.0*** 2.7*** L 
2006 1214 12.1*** 6.1** 22.2*** 3.1*** L 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively using 
the cumulative binomial distribution. 






Significant Return Variance Contribution Betas and Prior Returns 
Logistic regression of: 
 
jtjtjtttjtjtjt bbbbbba ε+++++++= −−− SizeTOVIXMRSDRRVCBeta 6514312110  
Where: 
 t.periodin  j fund oftion capitaliza edstandardizSize
and  t;periodin  j fund of turnover portfolioTO
 t; time to(VIX)atility market vol averagemonth -6VIX
 t; timereturn tomarket month -6MR
 t;period ofstart  at the j fund ofdeviation  standardreturn SD
 t;period ofstart   the tomonths 3or  6, 9,over  j fundon return  excess annualizedR





















  Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -2.193*** -2.387*** -2.389*** -2.422*** -2.347*** 
 (79.17) (46.56) (46.59) (47.66) (44.53) 
R9jt-1   0.470**   
   (4.52)   
R6jt-1    0.461**  
    (6.07)  
R3jt-1     0.091 
     (0.50) 
SDjt-1 -0.501 -0.342 -0.306 -0.336 -0.588 
 (0.62) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.34) 
MRt 0.616*** 1.025*** 1.114*** 1.105*** 1.070*** 
 (10.20) (14.26) (16.45) (16.00) (14.64) 
VIXt 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 
 (129.66) (61.39) (63.74) (62.34) (63.29) 
TOjt -1.158*** -0.986*** -0.975*** -0.970*** -0.990*** 
 (299.75) (106.41) (103.70) (102.49) (105.90) 
Sizejt 1.317*** 1.458*** 1.436*** 1.471*** 1.418*** 
 (35.25) (21.34) (20.66) (21.57) (19.94) 
N 10,985 5,565 5,565 5,542 5,516 
Cox & Snell R2 0.046 0.036 0.037 0.036 0.036 
Nagelkerke R2 0.063 0.049 0.050 0.050 0.049 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Wald 





Significant Tracking Error Variance Contribution Betas and Prior Returns 
Logistic regression of: 
jtjtjtttjtjtjtjt bbbbbbba ε++++++++= −−−− SizeTOVIXMRSDTESDRTEVCBeta 761541312110  
Where: 
 t.periodin  j fund oftion capitaliza edstandardizSize
and  t;periodin  j fund of turnover portfolioTO
 t; time to(VIX)atility market vol averagemonth -6VIX
 t; timereturn tomarket month -6MR
 t;period ofstart  at the j fund ofdeviation  standardreturn SD
 t;period ofstart  at the j fund ofdeviation  standarderror  trackingTESD
 t;period ofstart   the tomonths 3or  6, 9,over  j fundon return  excess annualizedR

























  Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -2.599*** -2.733*** -2.732*** -2.718*** -2.732*** 
 (80.66) (44.43) (44.39) (43.50) (43.76) 
R9jt-1   0.062   
   (0.06)   
R6jt-1    0.087  
    (0.15)  
R3jt-1     -0.089 
     (0.33) 
TESDjt-1 7.220*** 6.717** 6.624** 6.378** 7.102*** 
 (15.40) (6.50) (6.19) (5.71) (7.05) 
SDjt-1 1.921 2.578 2.643 2.512 1.863 
 (1.76) (1.71) (1.77) (1.58) (0.87) 
MRt 1.072*** 1.403*** 1.418*** 1.367*** 1.346*** 
 (22.25) (19.05) (18.77) (17.12) (16.08) 
VIXt 0.025*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (30.80) (8.56) (8.61) (8.78) (8.78) 
TOjt -2.065*** -1.971*** -1.970*** -1.987*** -1.990*** 
 (501.65) (227.00) (226.44) (227.28) (226.68) 
Sizejt 0.975*** 1.154*** 1.150*** 1.152*** 1.182*** 
 (13.79) (9.64) (9.54) (9.50) (9.99) 
N 13,582 6,818 6,818 6,779 6,756 
Cox & Snell R2 0.054 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.046 
Nagelkerke R2 0.092 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Wald 
statistic is given in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
